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The literature on co-speech gestures has revealed a facilitating effect of gestures on both the listener’s discourse 
comprehension and memory, and the speaker’s discourse production. Bucciarelli (2007) and Cutica and 
Bucciarelli (2008) advanced a mental model account for the cognitive change produced by gestures: Gestures, 
whether observed or produced, favour the construction of a mental model of the discourse they accompany. In 
this paper, we focus on gesturing while studying, assuming that gesturing while reading a text also favours the 
construction of a mental model of the text. In two experiments we invited adult participants to study two 
scientific texts and confirmed the predictions deriving from the assumption that gestures favour the construction 
of a mental model of the text: Gesturing while studying resulted in more correct recollections and text-based 
inferences (Experiment 1) and loss of verbatim recall (Experiment 2). 
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It is well known that gestures have a facilitating Mulligan, 2004). More important, it has also been  
 
effect on different aspects of speech comprehen- shown  that  the   actual  pattern  of   movements  
 
sion  and  production.  Studies  on  the  enactment constituting  a  SPT is  not  crucial  in  determining 40  
  
effect purport that gestures enhance memory for the   recall   level,   as   long   as   the   patterns   are  
 
speech. The term enactment refers to the finding appropriate  to  the  accompanying  speech  (e.g.,  
 
that  ‘‘in  memory  tasks  involving  lists  of  action Noice  &  Noice,  2007).  Noice  and  Noice  (2007)  
 
phrases like ‘wave good-bye’, ‘put a glove’, etc., detected the so-called nonliteral enactment effect,  
 
recall and recognition scores are enhanced when namely action-enhanced memory for verbal ma- 45  
  
the  participants  are  instructed  to  perform  the terial  that  was  not  literally  congruent  with  the  
 
action  during  encoding  (subject-performed  task, performed actions, but was related to the move-  
 
SPT),  compared  to  the  standard  condition  in ments at a higher order level (e.g., at the action  
 
which  they  only  read  or  listen  to  the  phrases’’ goal  level).  Findings  in  the  enactment  literature  
 
(Feyereisen, 2009, p. 374). Some studies revealed are   consistent   with   findings   about   co-speech 50  
  
that  enactment  is  effective,  although  not  in  the gestures;   this   is   not   surprising,   as   SPTs   and  
 
same measure, also when the individual observes EPTs,  especially  when  the  gesture  performed  is  
 
another  person  performing  the  action  (experi- not  literally  congruent  with  the  speech,  closely  
 
menter-performed task, EPT) (e.g., Hornstein & resemble  co-speech  gesture  (e.g.,  Cohen,  1989).  
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55 However, the studies on the enactment are mainly 
concerned with recognition and memory for lists of 
words or list of phrases (e.g., Feyer-esein, 2009), 
rather than discourses. As a conse-   
 quence,  they  disregard  the  beneficial  effect  of 
 
60 gestures  on  comprehension  and  learning  in  a  
  
 broader  view;  in  this  respect,  the  studies  on  co- 
 
 speech  gestures  are  more  relevant,  as  they  also 
 
 deal   with   the   role   of   gestures   in   discourse 
 
 comprehension. 
 
65 The  studies  on  co-speech  gestures  revealed  
 
 
 that speaker’s gesture facilitate hearer’s discourse 
 
 comprehension  (see,  e.g.,  Goldin-Meadow,  2000; 
 
 Wagner   Cook,   Mitchell,   &   Goldin-Meadow, 
 
 2008). Co-speech gestures provide symbolic and/ 
 
70 or  analogic  information  that  interacts  with  that  
 
 
 conveyed  by  speech  to  reconstruct  the  commu- 
 
 nicative  meaning  by  reinforcing,  specifying  or 
 
 adding discourse contents. 
 
 To   our   knowledge,   however,   none   of   the 
 
75 studies  in  the  literature  on  co-speech  gestures  
 
 
 have  accounted  for  the  cognitive  mechanisms 
 
 underlying  their  facilitating  effect.  We  already 
 
 advanced an account for the facilitating effects of 
 
 co-speech  gestures  for  the  hearer  (Bucciarelli, 
 
80 2007;   Cutica   &   Bucciarelli,   2008,   2011):   The  
 
 
 information conveyed by the speaker’s co-speech 
 
 gestures,  represented  in  a  nondiscrete  format,  is 
 
 easily   included   in   the   mental   model   of   the 
 
 discourse  because  mental  models  too  are  non- 
 
85 discrete  representations  (see,  e.g.,  Hildebrandt,  
 
 
 Moratz, Rickheit, & Sagerer, 1999). 
 
 As concerning the effect of gestures produced 
 
 by  the  learner  (in  the  learning  phase),  several 
 
 studies  found  that  concepts  may  be  initiated  in 
 
90 gesture before they are conveyed in speech (e.g.,  
  
 Wagner Cook et al., 2008), and that gestures may 
 
 provide  a  vehicle  that  allows  the  individual  to 
 
 express  thoughts  difficult  to  express  in  speech 
 
 (e.g.,  Goldin-Meadow,  2001).  Indeed,  gesticula- 
 
95 tion  is  also  involved  in  the  speaker’s  mental  
 
 
 organisation   of   the   discourse   by   helping   to 
 
 organise the stream of thought (see e.g., Alibali, 
 
 Kita, & Young, 2000), by reducing the cognitive 
 
 load  and  leaving  more  resources  available  for 
 
100 other tasks (see, e.g., Alibali & DiRusso, 1999), as  
 
 
 well as by helping in the conceptual planning of 
 
 utterances  (see,  e.g.,  Kita,  2000).  Thus,  gestures 
 
 also have a facilitating effect for the speaker. In 
 
 our  terms,  a  speaker  who  has  a  good  mental 
 
105 model  of  the  concept  to  be  expressed  has  less  
 
 
 need  to  gesticulate  than  a  speaker  who  has  a 
 
 poorer   mental   model   (Cutica   &   Bucciarelli, 
 
 2011). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The leading question of our investigation is: Does 
inviting a learner to gesticulate while study-ing a text 
have a beneficial effect on the con-struction of a 
complete mental model of the text content? This 
assumption is consistent with the results reported in 
the enactment literature sug-gesting that 
nonspontaneous gestures may also facilitate memory; 
it is, however, grounded on a unifying mental model 
framework, where ges-tures, whether observed or 
produced, facilitate the construction of a mental 
model of the text/ discourse. 
 
 
 
 
HOW GESTURING ENHANCES THE 
CONSTRUCTION OF A MENTAL 
MODEL OF THE TEXT 
 
The mental model theory may account for the 
cognitive changes brought about by gesturing while 
reading a text, and thus for the role of gesturing in 
the construction of the meaning of the text. Our main 
assumption is that gestures might lead to the 
construction of representations that are easily 
incorporated into the text model, alongside the 
representations constructed on the basis of the verbal 
information, enriching these and completing the 
mental model.  
According with the literature, we considered as 
indicators of model construction the amount of 
correct recollections and of inferences produced by 
the learner, and the poor verbatim recognition of the 
text. Indeed, individuals who have built a good 
mental model of a given material are more likely to 
recall more correct information; and, more 
importantly, are more likely to draw correct 
inferences from the information explicitly con-tained 
in the material, with respect to individuals who, faced 
with the same material, have built a poorer mental 
model (Johnson-Laird, 1983). More specifically, we 
distinguish between dis-course-based inferences, 
based on mental models, and elaborative inferences, 
which embellish or add details to the text (see, e.g., 
Singer, 1994). Thus, elaborative inferences may 
interfere with the recovery of previously presented 
information, whereas discourse-based inferences are 
proper inferences. According to the search-after-
meaning theory, examples of discourse-based 
inferences are concerned with the causal antecedent, 
the causal consequent, the character’s emotional 
reaction, and mental states (Graesser, Singer, & 
Trabasso, 1994). 
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Another possible indicator of the building of an 
articulated mental model of some given material is 
poor retention of the text or discourse surface form 
(for experimental evidence see, e.g., Garnham, 
Oakhill, & Cain, 1998). This happens because mental 
models derived from a text or discourse do not 
encode the linguistic form of the sentences on which 
they are based. It follows that if the person constructs 
an articulated mental model of the information she/he 
has been ex-posed to, she/he will recognise less 
information at verbatim level with respect to a person 
who does not construct a mental model. As gestures 
favour the construction of mental models, which in 
turn lead to loss of verbatim recall, it follows that 
gestures do not favour the retention of the text/ 
discourse verbatim. 
 
The findings within the enactment domain only 
apparently contrast with our expectation that 
gestures, by enhancing model construction, lead to 
loss of verbatim recall of the discourse. Indeed, 
within our proposed framework, a distinction is made 
between the effect of co-speech gestures on memory 
for sentences and on memory for dis-course. In the 
case of co-speech gestures accom-panying single 
sentences we assume that, in line with the enactment 
literature, gestures provide information that 
contributes to the creation of distinctive traces of the 
single sentences in the long-term memory. In the 
case of co-speech gestures accompanying connected 
sentences (i.e., discourse), we assume instead that co-
speech gestures favour the construction of a mental 
model of the discourse. Multiple connected sen-
tences give rise to the need to build an articulated 
discourse model. During this process, new pieces of 
information have to be integrated with one another 
and/or with prior knowledge, and any inconsistencies 
have to be solved. This is done by means of 
explanations, after which the discourse model that 
has been built so far has to be revised (see Khemlani 
& Johnson-Laird, this issue). 
 
Once a mental model of the discourse has been 
constructed, at the time of retrieval the representation of 
the information in the discourse is not in the form of 
distinctive traces; rather, the original information has 
been integrated into a single articulated mental model of 
the discourse. Hence, in order to tackle the construction 
of a mental model of the text, we invited the partici-
pants in our experiments to study a complete text. This 
gave them the possibility to build a single articulated 
mental model of the text and, as a 
 
consequence, draw discourse-based inferences and 
recognise less content at the verbatim level. 
 
 
 
EXPERIMENT 1: GESTURING 
ENHANCES LEARNING FROM TEXT 
(FREE RECALL TASK) 
 
The participants in the experiment were invited to 
study two scientific texts, one while gesticulating and 
the other without gesticulating. Then they were 
invited to recall as much information as they could. 
We expected to find that when people gesticulate 
while studying they (1) retain more information, and 
(2) draw more discourse-based inferences than when 
they do not gesticulate. Hence, we predicted a 
positive correlation be-tween number of gestures 
produced while study-ing and correct performances 
in the recall task. We had no predictions for the 
number of ela-borative inferences and errors. The 
former do not depend upon model construction, and 
errors are still possible when constructing a mental 
model of a text; any misunderstood information may 
be included in the mental model, thus supporting 
erroneous recollection. 
 
 
Method 
 
The experimental material consisted in two scien-
tific texts, one concerning airplane flight (here-after, 
Airplane, see Appendix A1) and the other concerning 
the nature of sound (hereafter, Sound, see Appendix 
B1). We chose such scientific texts because we are 
interested in strategies that may aid learning, and 
scientific texts are a typical material that learners 
have to deal with. Further-more, the content of both 
texts is mostly concrete, and thus should be 
particularly apt to elicit gestures. Indeed, we already 
used both texts in a former study and we found that 
participants, when invited to explain them to a 
counterpart, were prone to accompany with gestures 
their explanations. 
 
Each participant encountered both texts, one in the 
Gesture condition and the other in the No Gesture 
condition. Half of the participants dealt first with the 
gesture condition, and half with the no gesture 
condition; in each group, half of the participants 
encountered first the Airplane text, and half of them 
the Sound text. In the gesture condition participants 
were invited to gesticulate 
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 while  studying  the  text:  They  were  asked  to 
 
260 represent the concepts they read in the text with  
  
 gestures. Participants in the no gesture condition 
 
 were invited to study the text while keeping their 
 
 hands   still.   Participants   in   each   experimental 
 
 condition  read  each  text  twice,  following  the 
 
265 same  experimental  procedure.  After  completing   
 
 the second reading of each text, participants were 
 
 invited to recollect as much information as they 
 
 could. All of the participants were videorecorded. 
 
  To code the results, each text was divided into 
 
270 52 semantic units, corresponding to as many main  
  
 concepts   that   the   learner   could   recall.   Each 
 
 concept   (i.e.,   semantic   unit)   recalled   by   the 
 
 participants  was  evaluated  by  two  independent 
 
 judges according to the following coding schema: 
 
275   -Literal  recollection:  a  semantic  unit  recol-  
  
 
  lected literally. 
 
  - Correct  recollection:  a  semantic  unit  recol- 
 
  lected through the participant’s own words.
1
 
 
  - Discourse-based  inference: a  recollection  in 
 
280  which the participant gave explicit informa-    
 
  tion   that   was   originally   implicit   in   the 
 
  semantic unit. 
 
  - Elaborative inference: a semantic unit recol- 
 
  lected with the addition of plausible details. 
 
285  - Erroneous recollection: a recollection with a  
   
  meaning   that   was  inconsistent with  the 
 
  semantic unit. 
 
  Two  more  judges  examined  the  gestures  pro- 
 
 duced by the participants while reading the texts. 
 
290 They  defined  hand  movements  that  had  a  clear  
  
 beginning  and  an  end  point,  and  that  were  also 
 
 temporally linked to the reading of an utterance 
 
 in  the  text  as  gestures.  Then  they  counted  the 
 
 number of gestures produced by each participant 
 
295 in the experiment. None of the participants in the  
  
 no gesture condition produced any gestures. 
 
 
 
Participants. Forty adults took part in the 
experiment (27 females, 13 males, mean age: 22); all 
were university students attending a 
 
1 
Although a correct recollection may assume the form of a literal 
recollection, we consider as correct recollections only those in which 
participants reformulate through their own words the content in the 
semantic units. Indeed, in our framework, literal recollections are not 
apt to reveal the construction of a complete mental model of the text: It 
is possible to have a verbatim recollection even when the underlying 
mental model is incomplete or not fully integrated (see predictions of 
Experiment 2). 
 
 
 
 
 
course in General Psychology, and all took part 
voluntarily. 
 
 
Results and discussion 
 
Two independent judges coded the participants’ 
recollections individually; they reached a signifi-cant 
level of agreement on their first judgements (Cohen’s 
k ranging from .80 to .89, all psB.001). For the final 
score, the judges discussed each item on which they 
disagreed, until reaching a full agreement. Consider, 
for instance, the following semantic unit in the text: 
‘‘Some of the air flows over the upper part of the 
wing’’. According to the coding schema, the 
statement ‘‘part of the air that hits the wing runs on 
the upper side of the wing’’ is a correct recollection, 
and the statement ‘‘the air hits the wing and passes 
underneath the wing’’ is an erroneous recollection. 
With respect to the semantic unit: ‘‘For an example 
where this can be seen (the perturbation in the 
environment begins to spread out, away from 
the source in all directions), think of waves on 
water’’, the sen-tence ‘‘An example is when an 
object falls into the water and produces concentric 
circles’’ is a discourse-based inference (it cites the 
cause of the effect that is mentioned). Finally, the 
sentence ‘‘How is it possible that an airplane can go 
up and fly for long distances?’’ is an elaborative 
inference of the semantic unit: ‘‘What makes an 
airplane rise into the sky and stay there even though 
it is heavier than air?’’ Table 1 shows the mean 
scores for types of recollection in the two 
experimental conditions. 
 
Results show that the two texts were compar-able 
in difficulty: Considering each type of recol-lection 
separately, we found no differences in performance 
with the two texts: unpaired t-test, t(38) comprised 
between 0 and 0.92, p comprised between .37 and 1. 
Hence, we pooled together the results for the two 
texts. As a general result, and in both conditions, 
scores for correct recollections were higher than for 
other sorts of recollections. As predicted, there were 
more correct recollec-tions and discourse-based 
inferences in the gesture condition than in the no 
gesture condition: t-test for dependent samples, t(39) 
₃4.86, tied pB.0001 and t(39) ₃2.13, tied p ₃ .02, 
respectively. Literal recollections, elaborative 
inferences, and erro-neous recollections occurred to 
the same extent in the gesture condition and in the no 
gesture condition: t-test for dependent samples, t(39) 
 
 
 
 
 
300 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
305 
 
 
 
 
 
310 
 
 
 
 
 
315 
 
 
 
 
 
320 
 
 
 
 
 
325 
 
 
 
 
 
330 
 
 
 
 
 
335 
 
 
 
 
 
340 
 
 
 
 
 
345 
                                       TABLE 1 
Mean types of recollections in the gestures and no gestures conditions in Experiment 1 
Condition (N 040) 
Gesture 
 M 
 SD 
No gesture 
 M 
 SD 
350 
5 
Literal recollections Correct recollections Discourse-based inferences Elaborative inferences Errors 
0.05 
0.22 
0.03 
0.16 
16.02 
 6.56 
12.38 
 5.21 
0.35 
0.53 
0.10 
0.44 
0.18 
0.39 
0.15 
0.36 
0.83 
0.78 
1.18 
1.22 
355 
360 
365 
370 
375 
380 
comprised between 0.17 and 0.14, t(39) comprised 
between 0.17 and 0.77, respectively. 
   Two more independent judges examined the 
gestures produced by each participant in the 
gesture condition and initially agreed to recognise 
95% of their hand movements as gestures; they 
achieved a significant level of agreement (Co- 
hen’s k ranging from .82 to .89, all psB.001). For 
the final score, the judges discussed each item on 
which they disagreed, until reaching a full agree- 
ment. By way of example, the following move- 
ment was considered to be an accompanying 
gesture; while reading the sentence ‘‘The upper 
surface of the wing is longer and more curved 
(than the lower surface)’’, the participant raised 
his right hand until it was level with his chest, 
holding it palm down and slightly concave, then 
drew an arc with his hand (moving it first upward 
then downward), outward with respect to the axis 
of the right-hand side of his body. 
   Table 2 shows the mean gestures produced by 
participants for each reading of each text. 
   Results show that participants in the gesture 
condition produced a comparable number of 
gestures while studying the Airplane and the 
Sound texts (over the two readings, a mean of 
59.76 and 56.42, respectively: unpaired t-test, 
t(38) 00.55, p 0.59. Hence, we pooled the results 
for the two texts. Also, participants produced a 
comparable amount of gestures in the first read- 
ing (a mean of 28.53 gestures) and in the second 
reading (a mean of 29.65 gestures): paired t-test, 
t(39) 00.86, p 0.40. 
                        TABLE 2 
Mean of gestures performed for each reading of each text in 
                      Experiment 1 
Airplane 
  First 
reading 
M 
SD 
29.10 
10.67 
Second 
reading 
30.67 
10.29 
  First 
reading 
27.89 
10.61 
Sound 
Second 
reading 
28.53 
10.35 
   The total amount of gestures performed in 
both readings by each participant positively 
correlates with the amount of correct recollec- 
tions, Pearson’s r 0.51, pB.0001. No correlations 
were found among the amount of gestures and the 
other types of recollection, Pearson’s r comprised 
between .01 and .20, p comprised between .21 and 
.94. 
   Globally considered, the results of Experiment 1 
confirmed the prediction that when people 
gesticulate while studying they retain more in- 
formation, and draw more discourse-based infer- 
ences than when they do not gesticulate. Both 
sorts of recollection denote learning from text. 
   As we said earlier, a possible indicator of the 
building of an articulated mental model of a text 
is poor retention of the surface form. Hence, we 
predict that gesturing while studying should lead 
to a decrease in memory for text verbatim. This 
prediction is relevant in that one may argue that 
the effect of gesturing we observed in Experiment 
1 was just a result of heightened arousal produced 
by gestures. If that would be the case, then 
gesturing would result in increased memory for 
text verbatim. 
385 
390 
395 
400 
405 
   EXPERIMENT 2: GESTURES 
    IMPOVERISH VERBATIM 
RECOGNITION (RECOGNITION TASK) 
The participants in the experiment were invited to 
study two scientific texts, one while gesticulating 
and the other without gesticulating. Then they 
were presented with a list of sentences and were 
invited to say whether each sentence was present 
in the original text. We expected to find that when 
people gesticulate while studying they have worse 
verbatim recognition of the text than when they 
do not gesticulate, because a well-articulated 
mental model should lead to a good memory for 
contents at the expense of impoverished memory 
for surface information. 
410 
415 
420 
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Method 
425 
430 
435 
440 
445 
450 
455 
The experimental material consisted of the same 
two scientific texts used in Experiment 1. For each 
text we chose nine sentences, and for each 
sentence we created a triplet: (1) the very same 
sentence present in the text (literally correct); (2) 
a sentence with the same meaning, but expressed 
with different words (paraphrase); and (3) a 
sentence inconsistent in meaning (wrong content). 
We thus created 27 sentences, with nine in each 
category (literally correct, paraphrase, wrong 
content); see Appendix A2 and B2 for examples. 
    As in Experiment 1, each participant encoun- 
tered both texts, one in the gesture condition and 
the other in the no gesture condition. Half of the 
participants dealt first with the Airplane text and 
half with the Sound text, and the occurrence of 
each text in the gesture and no gesture conditions 
was balanced across all participants. Participants 
in the gesture condition were invited to represent 
the concepts they read in the text with gestures. 
Participants in the no gesture condition were 
invited to study the text while keeping their hands 
still. The participants in each experimental con- 
dition read each text twice, following the same 
experimental procedure. As soon as the partici- 
pants had finished studying each text, they were 
presented with the list of sentences, one by one in 
random order, and were asked to say whether or 
not the sentences were identical to those they had 
actually read in the text (recognition task). We 
coded responses of ‘‘Yes’’ to literally correct 
sentences, and responses of ‘‘No’’ to paraphrases2 
and wrong content sentences as correct. 
  Participants. Forty students at Turin University 
(29 females, 11 males, mean age: 22), attending a 
course in General Psychology took part in the 
experiment. All took part on a voluntary basis 
and none had participated in Experiment 1. 
(i.e., literally correct, paraphrase, wrong content), 
we found no differences in performance between 
the two texts: unpaired t-test, t(38) between 0.04 
and 1.36, p between .19 and .94. Further, in order 
to verify our implicit assumption that participants 
would experience the same level of ease/difficulty 
in recognising the stimuli pertaining to each 
sentence category, we conducted several analyses 
of variance (Cochran’s Q-test). The results re- 
vealed that the stimuli were comparable in 
difficulty in both the gesture (Q value ranging 
from 14.23 to 19.41; p-value ranging from .12 to 
.42) and no gesture (Q value ranging from 11.79 to 
22.12; p-value ranging from .10 to .48) conditions. 
    Table 3 illustrates the mean correct perfor- 
mance in the gesture and no gesture conditions. 
    As predicted, a series of t-tests for dependent 
samples revealed that participants performed 
worse in the gesture condition than in the no 
gesture condition in recognising sentences that 
were actually present in the original texts, t(39) 0 
3.14, tied p 0.003. Moreover, performance with 
paraphrases, t(39) 00.08, p 0.93, and wrong con- 
tent sentences, t(39) 00.84, p 0.41, was compar- 
able for participants in the two conditions. 
465 
470 
475 
480 
485 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Previous studies in the literature have revealed 
that gestures facilitate both discourse comprehen- 
sion and production. Our studies also revealed 
that gestures facilitate learning while studying a 
text, at least on all those occasions in which it is 
more important to grasp the meaning of the text 
rather than keep memory for text verbatim. We 
advanced a mental model account for the role of 
gestures in the construction of the meaning of a 
discourse/text, thus offering a unifying perspec- 
tive on the role of gestures for the speaker and for 
the listener, as well as for the learner. 
                        TABLE 3 
 Mean correct performance with the different sorts of sen- 
tences in the two experimental conditions in Experiment 2 
Condition 
(N 040) 
Gestures 
 M 
 SD 
No gestures 
 M 
 SD 
Literally correct 
    (n 09) 
Paraphrases 
  (n 09) 
Wrong content 
   (n 09) 
490 
495 
500 
460 
Results and discussion 
The two texts were comparable in difficulty: 
Considering each type of sentence separately 
     In Experiment 1, which involves a recollection task, the 
production of a paraphrase corresponds to a correct perfor- 
mance. In Experiment 2, which is a recognition task concern- 
ing text verbatim, the acceptance of a paraphrase of the 
original sentence in the text corresponds to an incorrect 
performance. 
2 
6.10 
1.59 
7.65 
1.53 
5.05 
1.73 
5.10 
2.10 
5.80 
2.44 
5.25 
1.65 
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   Is there any possible alternative account for the 
role of gestures in the cognitive change underlying 
learning from text/discourse? One of the most 
influential theories of discourse comprehension is 
the Construction Integration (CI) model of com- 
prehension advanced by Kintsch (1998/2007), 
which is an extension of the theory formerly 
advanced by van Dijk and Kintsch (1983). Accord- 
ing to this theory, text comprehension occurs 
through the construction of a situational model 
of the text contents. Disregarding their different 
theoretical roots, the terms ‘‘situational model’’ 
and ‘‘mental model’’ can be considered to be 
equivalent. However, in our view the concept of 
‘‘mental model’’ can more easily accommodate 
the role of gestures in text/discourse comprehen- 
sion. In the CI model, Kintsch recognises the 
importance of incorporating extralinguistic knowl- 
edge in the modelling of discourse processing, but 
acknowledges that his model does not deal with 
this easily. In the CI model, images, perceptions, 
concepts, ideas, or emotional states are translated 
into predicateÁargument units because of practical 
considerations (Kintsch, 1998/2007, p. 45): ‘‘We 
know how to work with predicateÁargument units, 
and it is not clear how to interface linear or spatial 
analog representations with such units.’’ Kintsch 
claims that ‘‘[t]he predicateÁargument schema 
does not necessarily highlight relations that are 
significant in the realm of action and perception in 
a direct, analogous manner’’ (p. 47). And, indeed, 
what he tries to grasp in his notation (network of 
nodes) is the analogical structure of mental models 
`a la Johnson-Laird (pp. 108Á109). 
   Our assumptions on the role of gestures do not 
contrast with the CI model by Kintsch (1998/ 
2007), which, however, faces several problems for 
the implementation of mental models constructed 
from nonverbal information. We argue that the 
mental model theory is a better candidate for 
explaining the mechanisms underlying the role of 
gestures in discourse and text comprehension 
because of its emphasis on the nondiscrete nature 
of mental models; the theory allows us to envisage 
a role for co-speech gestures (which visually 
convey information in a nondiscrete, iconic re- 
presentational format) within a theory of dis- 
course/text comprehension. A further challenge 
for the CI model is to account for the loss of 
verbatim recall following the construction of a 
mental model of the discourse/text; one further 
main difference between the mental model theory 
and the CI model is that the former emphasises 
the fact that text verbatim is lost once the model 
has been constructed; this prediction was verified 
by the results of our former and present studies. 
   In conclusion, the mental model theory ap- 
pears to provide the most appropriate account for 
the cognitive change produced by gestures in 
discourse/text comprehension, production, and 
learning. Future studies might verify the effects 
of gestures on learning in studying subjects’ texts 
other than scientific. 
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APPENDIX A 
645 
again behind the wing./ The upper part of the 
wing is highly curved./ The air ﬂowing over the 
upper part of the wing therefore/ has a greater 
distance to travel/ in the same period of time./ 
This means that the air ﬂow over the top/ 
travels at a higher speed/ than that under the 
lower surface./ When air moves faster, its 
pressure reduces./ You will probably have 
noticed, when you turn on the water in the 
shower,/ that the curtain moves inwards./ The 
running water /makes the air inside the shower 
move faster./ At this higher speed, it exerts a 
lower pressure against the curtain/ than that 
exerted by the stationary air on the other side./ 
The curtain is thus forced inwards./ A similar 
principle applies to the aircraft wings./ Given 
that the air above the wing moves quicker,/ it 
tends to spread out./ The pressure on the upper 
part of the wing reduces./ The upper surface of 
the wing is at lower pressure/ than the lower 
surface of the wing./ The downward force 
exerted by the air ﬂowing over the wing/ is less 
than the upward force from the air under- 
neath,/ thus creating a net upward force on 
the wing*this is lift./ The lift generated by the 
wings must exceed the aircraft’s weight./ 
670 
675 
680 
685 
690 
A1: The airplane flight text used in both 
Experiments 1 and 2 (semantic units 
are separated by slashes) 
What makes an airplane rise into the sky and 
stay there, even though it is heavier than air?/ 
The answer lies/ in an aerodynamic principle/ 
suggested by Daniel Bernoulli/in 1738./ The 
Bernoulli principle describes how upward 
forces,/ known as lift,/ act on the aircraft as it 
moves through the air./ A transverse section of 
a bird’s wing,/ a boomerang/ and a ‘‘Stealth’’ 
bomber/ all share a similar form to that of an 
airplane wing./ The upper surface of the wing is 
longer/ and more curved than the lower sur- 
face./ This difference creates what is known as 
an aerofoil./ To generate lift, air must ﬂow over 
the wing./ A 747 has a wingspan/of over 200 
feet,/ which is more than the height of a 15- 
storey building./ As it moves around the wing,/ 
the air presses on it in all directions,/ at right 
angles to its surface./ When an airplane is in 
ﬂight,/ the air divides as it hits the front of the 
wing./ Some of the air ﬂows over the upper part 
of the wing,/ and the rest over the lower part of 
the wing./ The two air ﬂows come together 
A2: Examples of sentences used for the 
Recognition Task of Experiment 2 
695 
Literal 
650 
  Paraphrases 
Wrong 
When an airplane is in flight, the 
air divides as it hits the front of the 
wing. 
During flight, the aircraft’s wings 
split the air into two parts. 
During flight, the air striking the 
aircraft’s tail splits into two parts. 700 
655 705 
 
660 
Literal  When air moves faster, its pressure 
            reduces. 
Paraphrases As the air moves faster, the pres- 
            sure that it exerts decreases. 
Wrong Air moving very slowly is at lower 
            pressure. 
Literal  The lift generated by the wings 
            must exceed the aircraft’s weight. 
Paraphrases The aircraft must weigh less than 
            the lift generated by its wings. 
Wrong An aircraft’s weight must be greater 
            than the lift generated by its wings. 
710 
665 715 
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B1: The nature of sound text used in 
both Experiments 1 and 2 (Semantic 
units are separated by slashes) 
Physically, sound is a waveform:/ it consists of 
mechanical waves conveying energy/ away from 
the sound source,/ which is a vibrating object./ 
What travels, then, is not material but rather a 
signal,/ a continual vibration of some element/ 
of the environment in which the sound propa- 
gates./ It all starts with the vibration of an 
object/ or part of it,/ as with the tip of a tuning 
fork./ The perturbation in the environment 
begins to spread out /away from the source in 
all directions,/ for an example where this can be 
seen think of waves on water./ This perturba- 
tion or signal makes every object vibrate that it 
meets on its path./ When the wave has passed 
by,/ everything returns to its original position./ 
There are two types of wave: longitudinal/and 
transverse./ With the former, the vibration 
occurs along the same axis/ as the wave’s 
direction of travel;/ with the latter, the vibra- 
tions/ are at right angles to the wave’s direction 
of travel./ An example of a longitudinal wave is 
the signal/ created by pressing on the end of a 
spring:/ the coils rhythmically/ move closer and 
further apart,/ while the signal propagates 
along the same axis on which the pressure 
was applied./ For a transverse wave, consider 
the signal/ created by a movement at one end of 
a rope:/ the signal propagates along the rope on 
an axis at right angles/ to the direction of the 
original movement./ Sound is a longitudinal 
wave,/ because the sound source vibrates in the 
same direction as the sound spreads./ This is 
what happens in a loudspeaker./ The waves 
may encounter many different objects as they 
spread out,/ but one of them is rather special: 
the eardrum./ This encounter triggers a highly 
intricate process/ that takes a sound signal/ and 
enables us to recognise a person’s voice/ and 
understand the words they spoke,/ or to identify 
a musical instrument/ and even the musician 
playing it./ But this only explains part of what 
sound perception is all about./ Once our hear- 
ing apparatus has completed its work,/ we hear 
music,/ a deliberate and structured combination 
of sounds/ created to give aesthetic pleasure,/ 
language,/a deliberate and structured combina- 
tion of sounds/ created to convey verbal in- 
formation,/ noise,/ an ill-deﬁned term used to 
refer to all other kinds of /unstructured, un- 
pleasant, unwanted sounds./ 
B2: Examples of sentences used for the 
Recognition Task of Experiment 2 
Literal : Physically, sound is a waveform. 
Paraphrases: From a physics standpoint, sound is 
            a wave. 
Wrong : Physically, sound is sudden and 
            irregular in nature. 
Literal: It all starts with the vibration of an 
            object. 
Paraphrases: Sound is created by a vibrating 
            object. 
Wrong: Sounds are created by the body of a 
            tuning fork. 
Literal: This perturbation or signal makes 
            every object vibrate that it meets on 
            its path. 
Paraphrases: Sound waves make every object 
            vibrate that they meets on their 
            path. 
Wrong: Sound signals avoid the objects that 
            they encounter on their path. 
